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CONFLICT AND COOPERATION BETWEEN
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IN CONTEMPORARY EGY PT
 
Al-Azhar, traditionally Egypt’s most respected and in˘uential center for Islamic
study, adopted an increasingly bold platform opposing Egyptian government policy
throughout the mid-1990s. Al-Azhar de˜ed government policy on a variety of  sensi-
tive issues, including population control, the practice of  clitoridectomy, and censor-
ship rights. Moreover, al-Azhar directly challenged the government in high-pro˜le
forums such as the United Nations International Conference on Population and Devel-
opment, held in Cairo in September of  1994. This open opposition was remarkable
in light of  the tremendous capacity that the Egyptian government has shown in the
past to manipulate and control al-Azhar. Over the past century, and particularly since
the 1952 Free O¯cers’ coup, the Egyptian government virtually incorporated al-Azhar
as an arm of  the state through purges and control over Azhar ˜nances, and by gaining
the power to appoint al-Azhar’s key leadership. Presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser,
Anwar Sadat, and Husni Mubarak all bene˜ted from this dominance over al-Azhar
by securing fatwas legitimating their policies. Given this overwhelming leverage,
what can explain al-Azhar’s increased opposition to the government throughout the
mid-1990s?
This article argues that the increase in Islamist violence from 1992 through 1997
gave al-Azhar more leverage over the government. Al-Azhar was willing to defend
the government from radical Islamist critics, which also threatened al-Azhar’s po-
sition in Egyptian society, but it took advantage of  this situation to press for Islamic
policies of  a more moderate cast. The government was forced to accept this bargain
as it became increasingly dependent on al-Azhar for religious legitimation. More-
over, the government found that manipulating al-Azhar and silencing its opposition
to state policy undermined al-Azhar’s in˘uence within Egyptian society and there-
fore its ability to discredit opponents of  the government. Finally, al-Azhar won
major concessions from the government by forming loose alliances with state
o¯cials sympathetic to al-Azhar’s interests.
The ˜rst part of  this article reviews the Egyptian government’s increasing control
of  religious institutions and the impact that government control has had on the
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standing of  these institutions in Egyptian society. The next section explores how
government domination of  religious institutions contributed to the rise of  militant
Islamist groups that challenged the legitimacy of  the religious establishment. And
part three examines how al-Azhar capitalized on government–Islamist tensions to
challenge the government and to gain major concessions. I end with an analysis of
government–Azhar relations since the appointment of  Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi
and a theoretical conclusion on the paradox of  state power and social control.
 
INCREASING STATE CONTROL OVER EGYPT’S  RELIGIOUS 
INSTITUTIONS
 
Since its establishment in 973 
 
A.D.
 
, al-Azhar has had an uneasy relationship with
Egypt’s rulers.
 
1
 
 The university has stood for centuries as an intermediate institution
between the state and society, at times cooperating with Egypt’s rulers and at other
times opposing them. As Egypt’s most important religious institution, al-Azhar faced
intense pressure from the state to legitimize its rule, but the state did not have suf-
˜cient resources to uniformly challenge its autonomy. Throughout the 19th and 20th
centuries, however, the Egyptian state increasingly interfered in the aˆairs of  reli-
gious institutions.
Muhammad çAli (1805–48) was the ˜rst Egyptian ruler to challenge systemati-
cally the power of  Egypt’s religious institutions. As part of  his program to build a
modern Egyptian state and challenge the Ottoman government for control of  the em-
pire, Muhammad çAli reorganized land ownership and nationalized 600,000 feddans
(623,000 acres) of  waqf  land
 
2
 
 that had previously ˜nanced mosques and religious
schools and formed the economic foundation of  the ulama.
 
3
 
 This action impaired the
autonomy of  the ulama and made them more dependent on ˜nancing through state
channels. In addition, Muhammad çAli created an independent justice system to cir-
cumvent the control of  religious institutions. Another signi˜cant blow to al-Azhar
came with Muhammad çAli’s founding of  a secular school system for doctors, law-
yers, engineers, and government bureaucrats.
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 These new secular institutions left
Azhar graduates with fewer opportunities and less in˘uence in the expanding govern-
ment bureaucracy.
 
5
 
Successive governments gained further control of  al-Azhar through reorganization
laws in 1896, 1911, and 1930. These laws radically transformed al-Azhar’s decen-
tralized structure and its role in Egyptian society. The reorganizations centralized
al-Azhar’s administration and gave the Shaykh al-Azhar
 
6
 
 more authority over its
many power centers.
 
7
 
 These laws also increased the scope of  al-Azhar’s authority
over religious education by granting it jurisdiction over the Teachers’ Training Col-
lege and the School of  Religious Law.
 
8
 
 By centralizing authority within al-Azhar,
the successive reorganizations facilitated al-Azhar’s manipulation by the state. At the
same time, however, centralization bene˜ted interests within al-Azhar, such as the
less-established 
 
riw
 
a
 
q
 
 and the o¯ce of  Shaykh al-Azhar. These common interests
between the state and in˘uential actors within al-Azhar explain why some Azhar
shaykhs were inclined to cooperate with the government despite increasing govern-
ment regulation of  religious institutions.
The greatest government incursions into Egypt’s religious institutions in general
and al-Azhar in particular came after the 1952 Free O¯cers’ coup. Egypt’s new leader,
LONG
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Gamal Abdel Nasser, understood the importance of  gaining control over al-Azhar in
order to ensure domestic control and promote his foreign-policy objectives. Within
Egypt, Nasser wanted al-Azhar to lend legitimacy to his regime and its program of
transforming Egyptian society. Subordinating al-Azhar to the state also would allow
Nasser to balance the in˘uence of  the Muslim Brotherhood, which threatened to mo-
bilize Egyptians against the government. Moreover, Nasser understood that al-Azhar’s
in˘uence extended well beyond the borders of  Egypt and that government control
over the most respected and in˘uential institution of  Islamic scholarship would be an
important tool in furthering Egypt’s leadership of  Arab and Islamic nations.
Just as Muhammad çAli had done more than a century earlier, Nasser ˜rst at-
tempted to undermine the in˘uence of  the ulama through the 1952 land-reform law.
This law placed all waqf  land, which had risen to 12 percent of  all arable land since
Muhammad çAli’s rule, under the control of  the new Ministry of  Endowments (
 
Wiz-
 
a
 
rat al-Awq
 
a
 
f
 
).
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 Through control of  waqf  lands, the government gained the author-
ity to distribute waqf  resources and the power to reward those who followed the lead
of  the government and punish those who did not. In 1955, Nasser also abolished all
shariça courts, which had run parallel to the secular courts established by Muham-
mad Ali in the 19th century.
 
10
 
 Again, the Free O¯cers were continuing Muhammad
çAli’s struggle to break the autonomy of  Egypt’s religious institutions and shape their
resources to serve the interests of  the state.
Nasser’s most ambitious attempt to secure the state’s dominance over al-Azhar came
in a 1961 law that radically reorganized the institution.
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 The reorganization ˜rst
placed al-Azhar under the formal jurisdiction of  the Ministry of  Endowments. All
Azhar ˜nances were to be directed through the appropriate state channels, giving
non-Azhar state o¯cials signi˜cant in˘uence over al-Azhar’s functions. Under the
1961 law, the Egyptian president and the minister of  endowments were also given
formal jurisdiction over important issues of  appointment, most notably the appoint-
ment of  the Shaykh al-Azhar. Additionally, the Azhar High Council was reorganized
to include three government-appointed “experts in university education” and repre-
sentatives from the ministries of  Endowments, Education, Justice, and Treasury.
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Finally, the 1961 reorganization expanded al-Azhar considerably from just three col-
leges of  theology, Arabic, and shariça to include many secular colleges, such as med-
icine, law, and engineering. The forced expansion of  al-Azhar into secular ˜elds of
study ensured that an increasing number of  deans representing non-religious ˜elds
would be represented in the Azhar High Council. The impact of  this reorganization
was profound. Al-Azhar was transformed from an institution with a high degree of
independence to one with very little autonomy from government interference.
The 1961 law of  reorganization was met with strong opposition from within
al-Azhar. During implementation of  the reorganization law, Nasser was forced to
appoint a series of  temporary directors from the military.
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 While very little infor-
mation is available about the circumstances of  the opposition to government in-
trusion, it is clear that these directors of  Azhar aˆairs were charged with removing
all resistance to government control. From 1959 to 1963, the number of  faculty at
al-Azhar dropped from 298 to 215.
 
14
 
 It is assumed that the eighty-three Azhar scholars
who were removed were the most vocal in their opposition to government control.
 
15
 
Moreover, Law 818 of  1963 set up committees that were designed to purge al-Azhar
of  all faculty who were unwilling to support the programs of  Nasser’s regime. From
 6
 
ıTamir Moustafa
 
FIGURE 1.
 
Total Azhar budget, 1935–66. The ˜gures for 1949–52 and 1964–65 are estimated. Budget
˜gures were unavailable for these years. To my knowledge, budget ˜gures after 1966 are also
unavailable. However new projects and expanded programs suggest that al-Azhar’s budget
continued to be well funded after this period. 
 
Source
 
: Crecelius, 
 
The çUlama and the State
 
,
442.
 
1963 to 1968, these committees purged forty-˜ve more Islamic scholars, bringing
the number of  faculty down to only 170. Chris Eccel observes that by 1975, the fac-
ulty of  al-Azhar was almost completely transformed. The vast majority of  scholars
who received their education prior to the 1952 revolution were replaced by younger
faculty members who had received their degrees in the 1960s and 1970s under Nasser.
In addition to more overt forms of  coercion, the government pushed through re-
forms by exploiting ideological cleavages that had existed among Azhar scholars for
years. The government created alliances with progressive shaykhs who wanted to
reform al-Azhar even if  it meant giving up the institution’s autonomy. Among those
who cooperated with the government was Muhammad al-Bahay, who was later re-
cruited to the position of  minister of  endowments and director of  al-Azhar aˆairs.
Similarly, the government exploited personal rivalries and made alliances with oppor-
tunists who sought high o¯ces within al-Azhar.
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Although many Azhar scholars were bitter about increasing government regula-
tions and al-Azhar’s reduced autonomy, the institution gained crucial state resources
in the process. From 1952 to 1966 alone, al-Azhar’s budget increased more than four
times, from 1,537,000 Egyptian pounds to 7,000,000 Egyptian pounds. Financial
support from the state allowed al-Azhar to double its student enrollment, increase
salaries for its scholars, oˆer more foreign scholarships, and increase its number of
foreign missions throughout Africa, Asia, and the Middle East sevenfold.
 
17
 
 In addi-
tion, budget increases allowed al-Azhar to carry out massive capital projects, such as
building a new campus in Madinat Nasr and expanding its nationwide program of
primary and secondary education (Figure 1).
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With the 1961 reorganization and the subsequent purges of  al-Azhar faculty,
Nasser gained the valuable endorsement of  one of  Islam’s most in˘uential institutions
of  scholarship. Nasser used his new leverage over al-Azhar to secure fatwas that sup-
ported the regime’s increasingly socialist policies, particularly to legitimize the gov-
ernment’s commitment to land reform. While securing these fatwas from al-Azhar,
Nasser also established the Supreme Council of  Islamic Aˆairs, which addressed the
supposed connection between Islam and socialism. The Supreme Council’s publi-
cation, 
 
Minbar al-Islam
 
 (The Pulpit of  Islam), ran articles such as “Socialism and
Islam” and “The Cause of  the National Charter Is the Cause of  Islam.”
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Nasser also used fatwas to advance his foreign-policy objectives in the Arab and
Islamic world. In the rivalry between Nasser and King Faisal of  Saudi Arabia
throughout the 1960s, Nasser used al-Azhar’s fatwas to legitimize his policies and
appeal to the sensibilities of  Saudi Arabia’s citizens to rise up against their govern-
ment. Nasser’s regime transmitted similar appeals throughout the Arab and Islamic
world on Egypt’s international radio program “Voice of  the Arabs.” By 1963, “Voice
of  the Arabs” was transmitted in twenty-four languages, totaling an estimated 755
hours of  transmission per week.
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 In a similar vein, Nasser ˜nanced students from all
over the Muslim world to study at al-Azhar in order to increase the university’s con-
nections with other religious establishments and build its international in˘uence.
Anwar Sadat (1970–81) and Hosni Mubarak (1981–present) also took advantage
of  their leverage over al-Azhar to secure various fatwas supporting their own poli-
cies. Sadat was able to secure fatwas that justi˜ed overturning Nasser’s land-reform
program, his policy of  
 
In˜t
 
a
 
h
 
 (economic liberalization), and, most important, his
peace treaty with Israel in March 1979.
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 Mubarak has relied on similar fatwas from
al-Azhar to legitimize Egypt’s participation in the second Gulf  War
 
21
 
 and to con-
demn Muslim extremists, particularly since the latest wave of  violence that began in
1992.
In addition to gaining control of  al-Azhar, the Egyptian government has been keen
to gain control over Egypt’s thousands of  mosques. Traditionally, Egyptian mosques
have remained outside state control, but with the nationalization of  waqf  lands, the
government has increasingly taken charge of  their administration. This is consistent
with the government’s policy toward al-Azhar. Private mosques outside the govern-
ment’s control could pose a serious challenge to the state. No other societal organi-
zation is able to assemble such a large group on a weekly basis with an equal amount
of  in˘uence over the masses as does the mosque.
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 Beginning in 1952 and continu-
ing until today, the governments of  Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak have each partici-
pated in an ambitious program of  subsidizing and nationalizing virtually all of  Egypt’s
mosques.
 
23
 
 Table 1 illustrates the impressive scale of  the nationalization project.
This rapid increase in state ownership of  mosques illustrates the government’s seri-
ous commitment to the nationalization project. Although the government increased
the share of  state-owned mosques only marginally between 1962 and 1982, it was
largely successful in increasing the number of  mosques that received state support.
State support, at least in theory, increased the amount of  leverage that the govern-
ment could exert on private mosques. Under Mubarak’s leadership, however, the gov-
ernment has raised the pace of  mosque nationalization considerably and curtailed
the number of  permits for new private mosques, increasing the share of  state-owned
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mosques to 71 percent of  the total. The most intense eˆorts of  nationalization, espe-
cially in recent years, have targeted mosques located in the urban centers of  Cairo
and Upper Egypt, where the majority of  extremist violence has been concentrated.
 
24
 
Although ˜gures are not readily available on the cost of  this nationalization project,
it is clear that the government has spent a staggering amount of  money to bring this
number of  mosques under its control.
 
25
 
Along with the nationalization of  private mosques, the government has estab-
lished speci˜c regulations for controlling who preaches in state-owned mosques and
what kinds of  topics are addressed. In the 1970s, Sadat’s administration established
a network of  district o¯ces in all of  Egypt’s twenty-six governorates charged with
selecting imams for state mosques and monitoring their actions.
 
26
 
 In each district, a
committee composed of  the local directors of  the al-Azhar Institute and the Ministry
of  Endowments, and the director of  education and social aˆairs, selects among can-
didates aspiring to be an imam. Candidates are screened by the committee for any
radical religious or political sympathies.
 
27
 
 Those who meet the approval of  the com-
mittee are provided with a license to preach and are assigned to a speci˜c mosque.
Similar legislation has also passed through the People’s Assembly requiring preach-
ers in all remaining private mosques to be approved and licensed through the Min-
istry of  Endowments.
The High Council for Islamic Preaching, another district committee composed of
the under-secretary of  the Ministry of  Endowments, the director of  mosques, the di-
rector of  the fatwa in al-Azhar, and senior ulama, has the authority to decide the top-
ics to be covered in state-controlled mosques.
 
28
 
 The High Council drafts a quarterly
plan detailing acceptable topics for Friday sermons for distribution to all state
mosques. Imams who stray too far from the outlined topics are punished. Muham-
mad çAli Mahjub, Egypt’s former minister of  endowments, outlined this policy in a
recent interview. “When we receive reports and ascertain that a preacher is guilty of
violations that harm social peace and security, then we consider that he has moved
from preaching to political action. He must be removed.”
 
29
 
 When Mahjub was asked
who monitors these mosques, he calmly replied, “A report covering any excesses in
Egyptian mosques is compiled every week. Don’t worry; the mosques are under con-
trol.”
 
30
 
 Whether state monitoring is as e¯cient and eˆective as Mahjub claims is
questionable. What is clear, however, is the government’s objective of  regulating
mosques throughout Egypt.
 
 
TABLE
 
1
 
Trends in state and private mosque building, 1962–94
 
1962 1982 1994
 
 Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage
State controlled 3,006 17 6,071 19 50,000 71
Private 14,212 83 26,622 81 20,000 29
With state aid 999 7 7,160 27 N/A N/A
 
Without aid 13,213 93 19,462 73 N/A N/A
 
Sources:
 
 Berger, 
 
Islam in Egypt Today
 
, 18; Bianchi, 
 
Unruly Corporatism
 
, 190; 
 
al-Musawwar
 
, 23 Sep-
tember 1994, 40–42, 80.
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In sum, the Egyptian government has gone to extraordinary lengths to regulate
and co-opt religious institutions to use them in the service of  the state. It has virtually
incorporated al-Azhar as an arm of  the state, initiated an extensive program of  nation-
alizing private mosques, and instituted stringent controls upon who can preach at
public and private mosques. The Egyptian government sought control of  religious
institutions both to build its international in˘uence among other Islamic nations and
to safeguard its domestic security. The central dynamic throughout this period was
one of  institutional con˘ict, although at times Azhar shaykhs cooperated with the gov-
ernment when it bene˜ted their particular 
 
riw
 
a
 
q
 
, 
 
madhhab
 
, or even narrower personal
interests. Al-Azhar resisted most government assaults on its institutional autonomy,
but it was clearly the weaker institution of  the two. Over time, the government
achieved major concessions through purges of  Azhar shaykhs, control of  Azhar bud-
gets, and the manipulation of  long-standing ideological and personal rivalries.
Despite the loss of  its institutional autonomy, al-Azhar gained valuable ˜nancial
resources that were not previously at its disposal. Access to government coˆers was
an important institutional achievement, allowing al-Azhar to expand its role in
Egyptian society. However, increasing government control would also bring the
weakening of  al-Azhar’s most important resource over the years—its legitimacy
among the Egyptian public.
 
AL-AZHAR’S  CRIS IS  OF LEGITIMACY AND THE RISE OF RADICAL ISLAM
 
In the aftermath of  the Azhar reorganization and its apparent manipulation by the
Egyptian government, both institutions were subjected to increasing criticism from a
signi˜cant spectrum of  the Egyptian public.
 
31
 
 Shaykh çAbd al-Hamid Kishk, a well-
known Islamist preacher throughout Egypt and the Middle East, has been an outspo-
ken critic of  the government’s increasing encroachment on al-Azhar. Kishk, himself
a graduate of  al-Azhar before the 1961 reorganization, argued that government ma-
nipulation has soiled the integrity and position of  al-Azhar. According to Kishk,
“ever since the reform [of  1961], the leadership of  al-Azhar has ceased to render
any service to Islam.”
 
32
 
 Kishk, like many other Islamists, has condemned the gov-
ernment for its manipulation of  al-Azhar and called on the government to return the
institution to its pre-1961 status. At the same time, Kishk has condemned al-Azhar
for giving in to government pressure and acting as its pawn.
Similar attitudes toward the domination of  al-Azhar by the Egyptian govern-
ment are found in the opposition press. 
 
Al-Shaçb
 
, a daily newspaper with Islamist
leanings, frequently prints articles condemning the government’s manipulation of
religious institutions. An editorial by Ahmed çIzz al-Din that appeared in 
 
al-Shaçb
 
illustrates the diminishing respect for al-Azhar, at least in one section of  Egyptian
society. In the editorial, the author argues that “since the ‘nationalization’ of  al-Azhar
in the 1960s, governments have used the institution as a tool to deceive the public
and make it believe that Islam prospers in the country. . . . The government con-
stantly tries to draw the largest possible political gain from al-Azhar.”
 
33
 
 Statements
such as these in the Egyptian press con˜rm Barry Rubin’s assessment that “links
with the rulers, instances of  corruption, and decrees seemingly at odds with tra-
ditional Islamic practices eroded respect for al-Azhar.”
 
34
 
 Although it is di¯cult to
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ascertain just how much legitimacy al-Azhar has lost among the mainstream of
Egyptian society, it is clear that government interference, manipulation, and outright
co-optation has considerably tarnished al-Azhar’s integrity in at least one sector of
Egyptian society.
The government’s increasing control of  religious institutions was also perhaps the
single most important factor contributing to the resurgence of  radical Islamic groups,
including Jihad, Tak˜r wa al-Hijra,
 
35
 
 and al-Jamaça al-Islamiyya, that were intent
on overthrowing the Egyptian government through violent means. Studies analyzing
the grievances and demands of  Egypt’s militant Islamic groups suggest that one of
the central reasons for the rise of  religious militancy has been the increasing subor-
dination of  religion to the needs of  the government.
 
36
 
 Bianchi argues that “the very
success of  corporatist policies has served to radicalize those who reject the right of
state-appointed religious leaders to bend Islam to the needs of  a secularizing re-
gime.”
 
37
 
 Ellis Goldberg’s comparative study
 
38
 
 of  radical Islam and the Protestant
movement further suggests that the rise of  fundamentalism as a response to the
state’s strict regulation of  religion is not peculiar to Egypt and that we can expect to
see the same phenomenon in similar contexts elsewhere.
 
39
 
Whereas Kishk and more moderate Islamists called on the government to return
al-Azhar to its pre-1961 status as a relatively autonomous institution, militant Islam-
ist groups rejected the ulama and al-Azhar’s traditional role in Islam outright. The
most stunning and extreme symbol of  militant opposition to both the government and
al-Azhar itself  was the abduction and slaying of  Shaykh Muhammad al-Dhahabi, a
former minister of  endowments and al-Azhar aˆairs, by the Tak˜r wa al-Hijra group
in June 1977.
 
40
 
 The assassination shocked the ulama of  al-Azhar, as al-Dhahabi was
not only a government o¯cial but also a learned religious scholar. Moreover, Shukri
Mustafa, the leader of  the Tak˜r wa-al-Hijra group, used his trial as an opportunity
to declare that “Islam has been in decline ever since men have ceased to draw their
lessons directly from the Quråan and the sunna, and have instead followed the tradi-
tion of  other men, those who call themselves imams.”
 
41
 
 Shukri Mustafa, like other
militant Islamists, argued that the ulama had misguided Muslims with their own in-
terpretations of  Islam. According to Mustafa, the only texts that are required to
understand Islam are the Quråan and a dictionary for understanding the meaning of
some of  its terms. Both al-Dhahabi’s assassination and this assertion were clearly
fundamental attacks on the traditional role that al-Azhar and the ulama had enjoyed
in Egyptian society for more than a millennium.
 
42
 
At Anwar Sadat’s assassination four years later, an internal document of  the Jihad
group, entitled 
 
al-Faridah al-Ghaåiba
 
 (The Neglected Duty), was found, providing
another insight into the convictions of  Egypt’s militant Islamist groups. Like Shukri
Mustafa’s statement, the document dismissed the legitimacy of  both the government
and al-Azhar in no uncertain terms.
 
43
 
 According to Muhammad Faraj, author of
 
al-Faridah al-Ghaåiba
 
 and the leader of  Jihad, Egypt’s rulers must be overthrown
because they are apostates and do not rule Egypt in accordance with Islamic law.
Further, like Shukri Mustafa, Faraj argued that the ulama have misguided Muslims,
and he questioned al-Azhar’s role as the sole interpreter of  Islam.
 
44
 
This fundamental attack on al-Azhar’s role in Egyptian society did not go unan-
swered. Shaykh al-Azhar Jad al-Haqq çAli Jad al-Haqq prepared a lengthy refutation
of  
 
al-Faridah
 
’s position.
 
45
 
 Jad al-Haqq argued that al-Azhar plays an important role
 
LONG
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in Egyptian society, and that 
 
al-Faridah al-Ghaåiba
 
’s attack on al-Azhar is a “call
for illiteracy and primitivism in the name of  Islam, which will encourage the youth
to abandon their studies.”
 
46
 
 Jad al-Haqq also cited verses from the Quråan support-
ing the argument that the pursuit of  knowledge is itself  a form of  jihad.
 
47
 
 In an at-
tempt to justify the ulama’s position in Egyptian society, Jad al-Haqq recalled that
the Prophet once said, “the superiority of  the knowledgeable man over the [simple]
worshiper is like my superiority over the lowest of  you.”
 
48
 
 After quoting several
more examples from the Quråan and hadith, Jad al-Haqq concluded that “if  we ex-
amine all the instructions from the Quråan and how it urges knowledge, the pursuit
of  education, and the preference of  the ulama over others, we would have needed a
book, nay books.”
 
49
 
 In addition to defending al-Azhar’s role in Egyptian society,
Jad al-Haqq found himself  in the awkward position of  defending the government’s
policies on theological grounds. Jad al-Haqq argued that Islam continues to thrive
in Egypt and that, for the most part, the government has ful˜lled its duty of  safe-
guarding and promoting Islam.
 
50
 
Immediately after Sadat’s assassination, the Egyptian government likewise at-
tempted to discredit militant Islamists in its own way. Mubarak promptly arrested
4,000 suspected members of  Egypt’s most radical groups and appealed to prominent
shaykhs from al-Azhar to engage with them in a nationally televised “prison dia-
logue.” The dialogue failed, however, when the Azhar representatives were either re-
jected or mocked by prisoners who asked to be released, arguing that they had been
reformed by the guidance of  the ulama.
 
51
 
 The government appears eventually to have
realized that the Azhar representatives had lost much of  their legitimacy, because the
government dismissed the Azhar shaykhs and called in the moderate Muslim Broth-
erhood,
 
52
 
 which had more integrity in the view of  Islamic extremists and many
Egyptians in general.
The lesson that the government has learned from this incident and the increasingly
militant response to both al-Azhar and the government was that increased control
over al-Azhar is not necessarily in its long-term interests. Although the government
was able to secure fatwas from al-Azhar in support of  its policies, the manipulation
of  religious institutions also contributed to the rise of  militant Islam. In addition,
government control undermined the respect that al-Azhar once commanded from
many Egyptians. Just when the government needed al-Azhar to in˘uence society and
discredit militant Islamists, the institution was unable to do so. Paradoxically, increased
government control of  Egypt’s religious institutions did not help the government
legitimize its rule. Instead, it undermined the legitimacy of  both the government and
al-Azhar.
 
FROM CONFLICT TO COOPERATION:  MILITANT ISLAM AND THE 
AZHAR–GOVERNMENT ALLIANCE
 
With the resurgence of  militant Islam, the government and al-Azhar faced a com-
mon threat that pushed the two institutions into an uneasy cooperative eˆort. The
government found that its goal of  combating militant Islamists and restoring do-
mestic stability depended on a more independent al-Azhar that could provide a cred-
ible theological response to its radical Islamist critics. Mubarak could depend on
al-Azhar to provide a theological response to militant Islamists even without tight
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government control because these groups challenged the authority and integrity of
al-Azhar as much as they threatened the government. Statements from the late
Shaykh al-Azhar Jad al-Haqq çAli Jad al-Haqq exempli˜ed al-Azhar’s virulent con-
demnation of  militant Islamists and the recent violence in Egypt. According to Jad
al-Haqq:
 
Those who [commit violence] are not Islamists and do not represent Islam. They are criminals
who must be punished. Every individual who challenges public order and the state’s authority
and power must be punished. Such an individual is not an Islamist at all. Those who make
mischief  in the land are the enemies of  God and his prophet.
 
53
 
If  we consider al-Azhar’s institutional interests, it is quite understandable why the
ulama would cooperate with the government to discredit militant Islamists. It is safe
to assume that throughout al-Azhar’s history, it has had three central interests:
1. to maintain its institutional autonomy;
2. to preserve its respected status in Egyptian society by maintaining its informal
role as the preeminent interpreter of  Islamic texts and traditions; and
3. to safeguard and encourage the propagation of  Islam.
 
54
 
In supporting government eˆorts to discredit radical Islamists, al-Azhar advanced
all three of  these fundamental objectives. The ˜rst of  al-Azhar’s central objectives,
maintaining its institutional autonomy, was for years in direct con˘ict with the gov-
ernment’s desire to control religious institutions. As we have seen, this produced
protracted con˘ict between the two institutions. However, with escalating violence
through the early 1990s, the government became increasingly dependent on al-Azhar’s
orthodox critiques of  radical Islamist ideologues.
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 This gave al-Azhar more lever-
age vis-
 

 
-vis the government than it had enjoyed in years. Al-Azhar’s indepen-
dence was further promoted throughout this period because the government could
not interfere in al-Azhar’s aˆairs without signi˜cantly undermining its eˆorts to
discredit the claims of  militant Islamists. By 1992, al-Azhar was able to take posi-
tions on social and political issues that clearly diverged from the government as
a direct result of  this new leverage.
The second of  al-Azhar’s central objectives, preserving its respected status in
Egyptian society, was distinctly threatened by the rise of  militant Islam. As we have
seen, militant Islamists dismissed the ulama’s traditional role as revered scholars
and indispensable interpreters of  Islamic texts. To maintain its status, al-Azhar
moved to discredit militants on theological grounds and bene˜ted from government
eˆorts to physically suppress militant Islamic groups. Essentially, al-Azhar cooper-
ated in a loose division of  labor, with the government ensuring al-Azhar’s monopoly
on religious leadership through physical coercion and al-Azhar discrediting militant
Islamists on theological grounds.
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 Al-Azhar’s increasingly critical stands toward
government policies also served to preserve its respected status in Egyptian society.
These stands acted as important signals to the Egyptian public that al-Azhar was not
a pawn of  the government, as radical Islamists claimed.
The rise of  a militant Islamic threat also indirectly facilitated al-Azhar’s eˆorts
to advance its third central objective of  propagating Islam in Egypt. As we have
seen, the Egyptian government was forced to grant al-Azhar increased autonomy so
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it could provide a credible theological response to militant Islamists. While the gov-
ernment’s primary concern was the control of  radical Islamic groups that threatened
Egypt’s stability, al-Azhar took advantage of  its new-found space and leverage to
pursue broader interests that extended far beyond the role that the government pre-
scribed.
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 Johannes Jansen has made the general observation that “although al-Azhar
and its graduates are essentially loyal to whatever government rules Egypt, al-Azhar
is a constant source of  ‘calm pressure’ in the direction of  further Islamization of
society.”
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 This observation invites us to take a closer look at how al-Azhar was able
to manipulate the di¯cult situation facing Mubarak’s government and press for a
more pious state and society in contemporary Egypt.
 
AL-AZHAR TAKES THE OFFENSIVE
 
From 1992 to 1996, al-Azhar increasingly opposed government policy on a number
of  sensitive issues. It also achieved some remarkable concessions. An important ex-
ample of  al-Azhar’s increased freedom to maneuver was its ˜rm opposition toward
Egyptian government policy on clitoridectomy.
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 In September 1993, the Cable
News Network (CNN) broadcast a report on clitoridectomy in Egypt in which a re-
porter had ˜lmed a graphic scene of  a ten-year-old girl screaming and kicking as her
genitals were cut as part of  a tradition that is observed in Egypt and much of  Africa.
Although the international coverage prompted the Egyptian government to condemn
the practice of  clitoridectomy, al-Azhar adamantly defended the practice. Shaykh al-
Azhar Jad al-Haqq çAli Jad al-Haqq issued a fatwa stating that “if  girls are not cir-
cumcised as the Prophet [Muhammad] said, they will be subjected to situations that
will lead them to immorality and corruption.”
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 Clitoridectomy continues to be a
highly contentious issue, with government agencies formally opposed to the prac-
tice, most al-Azhar scholars and radical Islamists defending it, and the court acting
as a forum to contest the tradition.
Another important example of  al-Azhar’s increasing criticism of  government
policy was its vocal opposition to the United Nations International Conference on
Population and Development (ICPD), held in Cairo in 1994. The ICPD was a great
achievement for Mubarak’s administration. The week-long conference, which attracted
state o¯cials and development specialists from nearly every nation in the world, was
a prized opportunity for the Egyptian government to build its role as a leader in the
developing world. Unfortunately for Mubarak, al-Azhar issued strong statements
against the ICPD every step of  the way. Al-Azhar’s main objections focused on the
conference’s platform regarding sexual relationships and abortion rights.61 The Islamic
Research Council of  al-Azhar condemned the sections of  the draft resolution that
advocated homosexual rights, defended premarital sex, and a¯rmed women’s right to
abortion.62 While Mubarak’s government received attention for hosting the U.N. con-
ference, much of  the coverage in the international press focused on the con˘ict
between al-Azhar and the Egyptian government. This was not the kind of  press that
Mubarak was hoping for.
It could be argued that al-Azhar’s strong stand on clitoridectomy and its opposition
to the 1994 U.N. conference platform was not necessarily an indication of  al-Azhar’s
new-found leverage vis--vis the government. Perhaps al-Azhar chose to take these
14ıTamir Moustafa
stands as a last resort against the increasing secularization of  the Egyptian state and
society, and issues of  the family, sexual relations, and reproductive rights were areas
in which al-Azhar was simply unwilling to follow the government’s lead.63 However,
other issues demonstrate that al-Azhar has taken similar stands against other govern-
ment policies and directives.
One of  the most startling stands that some al-Azhar ulama have taken against the
wishes of  the government has been to declare some of  Egypt’s most respected intel-
lectuals apostates of  Islam. The most publicized of  these fatwas was against the
Egyptian writer Farag Foda, who was accused of  blaspheming Islam after a heated
debate with al-Azhar shaykhs at the Cairo Book Fair. Just two weeks after the fatwa
was issued by radicals within al-Azhar, Foda was gunned down by Muslim extrem-
ists. Surprisingly, Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazzali, himself  a prominent member of
al-Azhar’s Islamic Research Council, testi˜ed at the trial of  the two suspected assas-
sins. Shaykh al-Ghazzali argued that it is the duty of  the government to put to death
those who are judged apostates of  Islam; if  the government does not ful˜ll this ob-
ligation, then others have the right to carry out the sentence.64 The Azhar Scholars
Front placed similar pressure on the government to ban Yousef  Chehine’s ˜lm The
Emigrant and the work of  the Cairo University professor Nasr Abu-Zeid,65 who is
accused of  blasphemy in his writings on the Quråan.
Al-Azhar has also achieved signi˜cant gains by forming loose alliances with state
actors who share its vision of  a more pious state and society. Just as the government
was able to exploit cleavages within al-Azhar by forming alliances with reform-
minded shaykhs, al-Azhar has managed to exploit ideological splits within important
state institutions. A recent ruling by Egypt’s Majlis al-Dawla66 is the most signi˜-
cant example of  Islamists in the state who have granted far-reaching concessions to
al-Azhar. In July 1993, the Shaykh al-Azhar submitted a letter to the Majlis al-Dawla
requesting clari˜cation of  which institution had jurisdiction over the censorship of
audio and audiovisual productions dealing with Islam.67 Although al-Azhar had pre-
viously acted as an adviser to the Ministry of  Culture, it now sought to gain a monop-
oly on censorship rights. By February 1994, the Majlis al-Dawla had arrived at a
decision in favor of  al-Azhar’s request for jurisdiction over censorship rights, de-
claring: “the Honourable Azhar is the ˜nal arbiter in the assessment of  the Islamic
factor, whose opinion is binding for the Ministry of  Culture concerning the grant-
ing or refusing of  a license for audio and audiovisual productions.”68
Egyptian intellectuals were stunned by the ruling because the Majlis al-Dawla has
a long history of  supporting liberal values and promoting secular principles. More-
over, the ruling was not in accordance with the general policy of  Mubarak’s ad-
ministration. Mubarak himself  had demonstrated his commitment to protecting free
speech just one month prior to the State Council’s ruling by creating the Higher
Council of  Culture. The Higher Council, composed of  twelve writers and journalists,
was designed by Mubarak to give a voice to Egypt’s intellectuals who faced increas-
ing threats and restrictions from Egypt’s growing Islamic movement.69
In the wake of  the Majlis al-Dawla ruling, attention focused on Tariq al-Bishri, the
chairman of  the General Assembly of  the Board of  Legislation within the State
Council.70 Al-Bishri, a respected judge and former leftist, became a moderate Islam-
ist. Because it was not al-Bishri alone who had made the ruling, it became clear that
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Islamist sympathizers had a presence within the Majlis al-Dawla. This example lends
credence the view that the state should be considered not as separate from society
but, rather, as an institution embedded within society. The state can often adopt pol-
icies that will enhance its “autonomy” from societal in˘uences, but this strategy can
never achieve complete success. Bureaucrats and even top decision-makers such as
al-Bishri are, after all, members of  the societies they govern.
The most astonishing aspect of  the Majlis al-Dawla ruling was that for the ˜rst
time al-Azhar’s decisions were to be binding upon the Ministry of  Culture. At a work-
shop sponsored by the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, çAsim al-Disuqi, an
Egyptian university lecturer, expressed the dismay of  many intellectuals and secular
government o¯cials, saying: “This fatwa marks a new phase in the relationship be-
tween al-Azhar and the state. The state has been using al-Azhar since 1895. . . . The
fatwa, however, changes the course of  this relationship; it is al-Azhar that is now
using the state through its own State Council.”71
The government’s reluctance to disregard this ruling and to punish al-Azhar for
its increasingly vocal opposition to a wide variety of  state policies was due to the
uncomfortable situation that the government faced. Although the state had proved
its capacity to manipulate al-Azhar in the past, it became increasingly dependent
on al-Azhar to discredit radical Islamists on theological grounds. Further, tight gov-
ernment control of  al-Azhar lends support to the extremists’ contention that the
secular state is corrupting and manipulating Islam for its own gain. Naguib Fakhry,
chairman of  the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, is one of  the few who has
articulated the changing government policy toward al-Azhar:
The government is trying to outdo the fundamentalists by making itself  look more religious,
and this is where the Azhar, as an ecclesiastical body imposing its rule, comes in. Men of  re-
ligion are increasingly gaining ground every day since the government believes that this is
the only way to ˜ght fundamentalism, despite the fact that these men of  religion may prove to
be even more of  a threat than the fundamentalists. It is this attempt by the government to play
the piety card that has brought the Azhar to the foreground and given it more powers.72
Given these gains, it is open to question whether the government or al-Azhar has
gained more from the two institutions’ relationship over the years. With its forced
reforms, the government clearly achieved the power to manipulate al-Azhar if  it so
chooses. The government has gained total ˜nancial control and the power to appoint
al-Azhar’s key leaders. The pressing question is whether manipulating these levers,
as it has done in the past, is in the long-term interests of  the government. The rise of
militant Islam in the 1970s and again since 1992, coupled with al-Azhar’s inability
to provide a credible theological response, suggests that the government can control
al-Azhar only at a considerable cost.
On the other side of  the equation, al-Azhar has clearly bene˜ted from access to
state resources. With ˜nancial support from the state, al-Azhar has been able to in-
crease its student enrollment and salaries for its scholars, expand its primary and
secondary branches throughout the country, and increase its number of  foreign mis-
sions. Al-Azhar’s reputation was adversely aˆected by its close association with the
government, but at the same time, the rise of  militant Islam allowed al-Azhar to
distance itself  from the government while retaining its privilege to state ˜nancial
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resources. The threat of  militant Islam to Egypt’s stability also gave al-Azhar suf-
˜cient leverage to challenge the government and even capture important functions
of  the Ministry of  Culture.
THE LATEST PHASE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN AL-AZHAR AND THE 
EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT
In March 1996, Mubarak was forced to make a momentous decision that would
aˆect relations between al-Azhar and the government for years to come. Shaykh
al-Azhar Jad al-Haqq çAli Jad al-Haqq passed away after heading al-Azhar for more
than fourteen years. Under the 1961 law of  reorganization, Mubarak was left with
the responsibility of  appointing a new Shaykh al-Azhar to replace the conservative
Jad al-Haqq. After only twelve days of  deliberation, Mubarak appointed the pro-
government Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi.73
Tantawi, the former Grand Mufti of  Egypt, diˆered from Jad al-Haqq on a number
of  issues. On clitoridectomy, he argued that the practice is merely a harmful custom
that is not in accordance with Islam. Similarly, Tantawi defended the International
Conference on Population and Development, which Jad al-Haqq had condemned,
arguing that abortion is acceptable in Islam under certain circumstances.74 Further,
he agreed with government policy on a number of  other controversial issues, such as
the ability of  banks to charge interest under Islamic law and the acceptability of
casinos and alcohol within the Egyptian tourist industry. Although Tantawi is
praised by many Egyptian intellectuals and human-rights groups for his progres-
sive stand on many issues, he is perceived by radical Islamists as the government’s
religious mouthpiece.
Mubarak’s appointment of  Muhammad Tantawi as the new Shaykh al-Azhar has
already led to increased con˘ict on a number of  levels. First, his appointment has
created discord within al-Azhar. Although Tantawi has support from progressive
ulama, conservative scholars have been highly critical of  the appointment, which
they view as an attempt by the government to reassert its dominance over al-Azhar.
Within a year of  the appointment, Tantawi took disciplinary action against conser-
vatives who had challenged his appointment and leadership. Shaykh Muhammad al-
Biri, president of  the Azhar Scholar’s Front, and Shaykh Yahya Ismçail Halbush,
general secretary of  the front, were forced to resign from their posts in April 1998
after they voiced intense criticism of  Tantawi’s meeting with Israel’s chief  Ash-
kenazi rabbi. By June of  the same year, Tantawi had completely dismantled the
board of  directors of  the Azhar Scholar’s Front after coming under ˜re for reforming
al-Azhar’s secondary-education program. Shaykh Fawzi al-Zifzaf, a loyal supporter
of  Tantawi, was appointed to head the Azhar Scholars’ Front, and he promptly
moved to de-politicize the front by transforming it into a charitable association.
Tantawi’s appointment has also increased tensions between radical Islamists and
the government. If  we are to understand radical Islamists as more than just the prod-
uct of  economic hardship, demographic pressure, and failure in government policy,
as Raymond Baker has suggested we do, then we should take seriously their cen-
tral grievance that the government is manipulating and corrupting religion for its
own bene˜t.75 The appointment of  Tantawi and the ongoing struggle within al-Azhar’s
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ranks only adds to the existing disillusionment of  radical Islamists. Moreover, the
appointment undermines al-Azhar’s ability to de-legitimize radical Islam and lends
legitimacy to extremist claims that the government corrupts and manipulates religion
for its own gain.
The appointment of  Tantawi may be viewed by some scholars as a sign of  the
strength of  the Egyptian state. Mubarak’s ability to appoint a progressive, pro-gov-
ernment scholar to head the most in˘uential institution of  Islamic study is indeed
a testament to the degree of  control that the Egyptian state has gained over al-Azhar
in the past century. However, as the experience of  the past several decades illus-
trates, this policy will ultimately be self-defeating despite any short-term bene˜ts that
the government may gain. Tantawi’s appointment should be seen not as a sign of  state
strength but, rather, as a sign of  the government’s increasing desperation. Mubarak is
well aware of  the long-term impact that Tantawi’s appointment will have on state–
society relations in Egypt. However, at the same time, he has seen the state’s control
of  society erode on a number of  fronts, primarily due to rapid economic liberaliza-
tion.76 The appointment of  Tantawi indicates that the Egyptian government is des-
perately seeking ways to shore up its control over society and that it is willing to
adopt short-term policies that may eventually undermine its rule.
CONCLUSIONS
The case of  religious regulation in contemporary Egypt suggests that government
leaders can either attempt to dominate intermediate institutions or seek a cooperative
relationship. In consolidating their control following the 1952 coup, Egypt’s leaders
opted for the prior strategy of  domination and engaged religious institutions in a
struggle for control. Although the government was able to dominate al-Azhar, such
a policy was not in the long-term interests of  the state because it led to the growth
of  radical Islam and the relative decline in the legitimacy of  al-Azhar, at least within
one segment of  Egyptian society. The shift from domination to a cooperative rela-
tionship in the early 1990s allowed the government and al-Azhar to confront the
challenge of  militant Islam and bene˜t from what Migdal, Kholi, and Shue term
“mutual empowerment.”77 However, the shift to a cooperative relationship was pain-
ful and frustrating for the government because al-Azhar’s renewed in˘uence meant
that the government was forced to bear increasing criticism from an institution that
it once dominated. As this criticism increased and al-Azhar scored further victories
over state institutions, the government found it more and more di¯cult to resist a re-
newed policy of  domination. The result was the appointment of  the pro-government
Tantawi as Shaykh al-Azhar in early 1996.
Gehad Auda has noted a similar pattern of  interaction between the government
and the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980s.78 As the government attempted to dis-
credit militant Islamists, it forged a cooperative arrangement with the moderate Mus-
lim Brotherhood that is strikingly similar to the government’s subsequent partnership
with al-Azhar. During this period, the Brotherhood renounced violence and pledged
to work within the political system for moderate Islamic reform. In return, the state
allowed the Brotherhood to run in the 1984 and 1987 parliamentary elections in
coalition with secular opposition parties and to participate in the elections for a great
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number of  Egyptian syndicates and associations. Auda argues that “this accommo-
dation found its driving force in the state’s need to create a popular base against radical
fundamentalists.”79 However, Auda contends that the government soon fell victim to
its own partnership as the Muslim Brotherhood took advantage of  its political lever-
age increasingly to criticize and pressure the government from within. Ultimately,
the government broke its arrangement with the Brotherhood and again attempted to
dominate the organization. Not surprisingly, this change of  strategy corresponded to
the resurgence of  Islamist violence in the early 1990s and the government’s renewed
courting of  al-Azhar.
Over time, Egyptian government policy toward religious institutions appears to be
schizophrenic: its policy toward both al-Azhar and the Muslim Brotherhood has shifted
back and forth between strategies of  domination and cooperation. These pendulum-
like shifts in policy are the result of  a paradoxical relationship between state power
and social control. The primary goal of  many developing states is to maintain social
control and pre-empt challenges to the state. Ful˜llment of  this goal pushes the gov-
ernment toward a policy of  domination. When the government has the capacity to
control intermediate institutions (particularly those which pose potential threats to
the state), it is likely to exert this control. Paradoxically, state domination has a per-
verse eˆect on these institutions and the state’s standing in society. These dynamics
force the government to reverse direction and enter into cooperative relationships
with social forces that share some of  its goals. However, as the case of  al-Azhar
illustrates, cooperative relationships are often fraught with tension because interme-
diate institutions begin to press for the government to further their own agenda. As
this pressure builds, the government is tempted to sever its cooperative relationship
and renew a strategy of  domination.
This analysis casts considerable doubt on state-centered approaches to politics that
are prone to the simplistic assumption that a preponderance of  state power over so-
ciety will inevitably give it the ability to shape society as it wants. The Egyptian case
of  religious regulation suggests that high levels of  state power can paradoxically un-
dermine the state’s control of  society. The endemic problem of  political instability in
the developing world in many cases is not the result of  weak political institutions, as
many would suggest. Rather, many developing states are simply too strong vis--vis
intermediate institutions, tempting the strong state to adopt short-term horizons and
policies of  domination that eventually invigorate opposition and undermine the state’s
hold on society.
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